Models in Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) can be analyzed by means of an importance index and an interaction index for every group of criteria. We consider first discrete models in MCDA, without further restriction, which amounts to considering multichoice games, that is, cooperative games with several levels of participation. We propose and axiomatize an interaction index for multichoice games. In a second part, we consider the continuous case, supposing that the continuous model is obtained from a discrete one by means of the Choquet integral.
Introduction
An important issue in MultiCriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is to be able to analyse and explain a numerical model, obtained by elicitation of preferences of the decision maker. A classical way to do this is to assess the importance of each criterion (see a general approach to define an importance index in (Ridaoui et al., 2017a) ). This description of the model may appear to be sufficient in the case of simple models, which are additive in essence (e.g., additive utility models), as it is well known that they imply mutual preferential independence of criteria (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) . However, in case of more complex models, the preferential independence among criteria does not hold any more, and interaction appears among criteria, so that a description of the model by the sole importance indices is not sufficient any more. For example, for models where aggregation of preference is done through a Choquet integral w.r.t. a capacity, an interaction index is defined for any group of criteria (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2010) , which is a generalization of the interaction index for pairs of criteria proposed by Murofushi and Soneda (1993) . Roughly speaking, a positive interaction index induces a conjunctive behavior (like the minimum operator), while a negative interaction index induces a disjunctive behavior (maximum).
Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, the cardinality of sets will be denoted by corresponding lower case letters, i.e., |N| := n, |S| := s, etc. For notational convenience, we will omit braces for singletons, i.e., S ∪ {i} is written S ∪ i, etc.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a fixed and finite set which can be thought as the set of attributes or criteria (in MCDA), players (in cooperative game theory), etc., depending on the domain of application. In this paper, we will mainly focus on MCDA applications. We suppose that each attribute i ∈ N takes values in a set L i , which is supposed to be finite and denoted by L i = {0, 1, . . . , k i }. The alternatives are represented as elements of the Cartesian product L := L 1 × . . . × L n . An alternative is thus written as a vector
, and any ℓ ∈ L i , (y −i , ℓ i ) denotes the compound alternative x such that x i = ℓ and x j = y j , ∀j = i. The vector 0 N = (0, . . . , 0) is the null alternative of L, and k N = (k 1 , . . . , k n ) is the top element of L. For each x ∈ L, we denote by S(x) = {i ∈ N | x i > 0} the support of x, and by K(x) = {i ∈ N|x i = k i } the kernel of x.
Let x, y ∈ L and T ⊆ N \ {∅}. x T is the restriction of x to T . We write x ≤ y if
The preferences of a Decision Maker (DM) over the alternatives are supposed to be represented by a function v : L → R. For the sake of generality, we do not make any assumption on v, except that
(1)
For convenience, we assume from now on that all attributes have the same number of elements, i.e., k i = k for every i ∈ N (k ∈ N). Note that if this is not the case, we set k = max i∈N k i , and we extend v :
This amounts to duplicating the last element k i of L i when k i < k. Under this assumption, we recover well-known concepts.
When k = 1, v is a pseudo-Boolean function v : {0, 1} N → R vanishing at 0 N . It can be put in the form of a function µ : 2 N → R, with v(∅) = 0, which is a game in cooperative game theory. A capacity (Choquet, 1953) or fuzzy measure (Sugeno, 1974 ) is a monotone game, i.e., satisfying v(A) ≤ v(B) whenever A ⊆ B. For the general case (when k ≥ 1), v : L → R fulfilling 1 corresponds exactly to the concept of multichoice game (Hsiao and Raghavan, 1993) , and the numbers 0, 1, . . . , k in L i are seen as the level of activity of the players. A k-ary capacity (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2003 ) is a multichoice game v satisfying the monotonicity condition: or each x, y ∈ L s.t. x ≤ y, v(x) ≤ v(y) and the normalization condition: v(k, . . . k) = 1. Hence, a k-ary capacity represents a preference on L which is increasing with the value of the attributes. We denote by G(L) the set of multichoice games defined on L.
The derivative of v ∈ G(L) at x ∈ L w.r.t. T ⊆ N \ {∅} such that ∀i ∈ T, x i < k is defined recursively as follows,
The general expression for the derivative of v ∈ G(L) is given by,
3 Values and interaction indices
The case of classical TU-games
In cooperative game theory, the notion of value or power index is one of the most important concepts. A value is a function φ : G(2 N ) → R N which assigns a payoff vector to any game v ∈ G(2 N ). In MCDA, values are interpreted as importance indices for criteria. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of player i ∈ N is given by
The concept of interaction index, which is an extension of that of value, was introduced axiomatically to measure the interaction phenomena among players in cooperative game theory or criteria in multicriteria decision analysis. For a game v ∈ G(2 N ), the interaction index of v is a function I v : 2 N → R that assigns to every coalition T ⊆ N its interaction degree.
? proposed an interaction index I(ij) for a pair of elements i, j ∈ N to estimate how well i and j interact. Grabisch (1997) defined and extended the interaction index to coalitions containing more than two players. The interaction index (Grabisch, 1997) 
Note that when S = {i}, the interaction index coincides with the Shapley value.
A first axiomatization of the interaction index have been proposed by Grabisch and Roubens (1999) , and it is axiomatized in a way similar to the Shapley value. The following axioms have been considered by Grabisch and Roubens :
• Linearity axiom (L):
• Dummy axiom (D): For any v ∈ G(2 N ), and any i ∈ N dummy for v,
• Symmetry axiom (S) : For any v ∈ G(2 N ), any permutation σ on N and any S ⊆ N \ ∅, I
v (S) = I σv (σS).
• Efficiency axiom (E) : For any v ∈ G(2 N ) and any i ∈ N, i∈N I v (i) = v(N).
• Recursive axiom (R1): For any v ∈ G(2 N ) and any S ⊆ N, s > 1,
where, v −j is the game v restricted to elements in N \ j defined by v −j (S) = v(S), ∀S ⊆ N \ j, and v −j ∪j is the game on N \ j in the presence of j defined by v
• Recursive axiom (R2): For any v ∈ G(2 N ) and any S ⊆ N, s > 1,
where, v [S] is the game where all elements in S are considered as a single element denoted [S] , it is defined by, for any K ⊆ N \ S:
The axiom (R1) says that the interaction of the players in S is equal to the interaction between the criteria in S \j in the presence of j minus the interaction between the criteria of S \j in the absence of j. Axiom (R2) expresses interaction of S in terms of all successive interactions of subsets. The authors have shown that (R1) and (R2) are equivalent under (L), (D) and (S) axioms.
The following theorem was shown by Grabisch and Roubens (1999) .
, (E), and ((R1) or (R2)), for all v ∈ G(2 N ),
3.2 The case of games on lattices Grabisch and Labreuche (2007) generalized the notion of interaction defined for criteria modelled by capacities, by considering functions defined on lattices. The interaction (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2007) is based on the notion of derivative of a function defined on a lattice. For this, they introduce the following definitions:
and the derivative of v w.r.t. y at x is given by:
The following definition has been proposed by Grabisch and Labreuche (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2007) :
where, A(x) = {y ∈ L|y j = k or 0 if j / ∈ J, y j = x j − 1 else }, h(y) is the number of components of y to k and α
Characterization of the importance index for multichoice games
In this section, we present the importance index (value) for multichoice games defined by Ridaoui et al. (2017b) together with its axiomatization. Let φ be a value defined for any v ∈ G(L).
Symmetry axiom (S): For any permutation σ of N,
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two games v, w ∈ G(L) such that, for some i ∈ N,
Ridaoui et al. (2017a) have shown the following result.
Theorem 2. Let φ be a value defined for any v ∈ G(L).
(i) If φ fulfills (L) and (N) then there exists a family of real constants {b i x , x ∈ L} such that
(ii) If φ fulfills (L), (N) and (I) then
(iii) If φ fulfills (L), (N), (I) and (S) then
where n(x −i ) = (n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k ) with n j the number of components of x −i being equal to j.
(iv) If φ fulfills (L), (N), (I), (S) and (E) then
Axiomatization of the interaction index
In this section we intend to define axiomatically the interaction index of multichoice games. The approach presented here is based on a recursion formula, starting from the importance index (value) defined in Section 4, as in (Grabisch and Roubens, 1999 ). An interaction index of the k-ary multichoice game v ∈ G(L) is a function
The first axiom (L) is trivially generalized for the interaction index.
Linearity axiom (L) : I v is linear on G(L), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L), ∀α ∈ R,
Proof . It is easy to check that the above formula satisfies the linearity axiom. Conversely, we consider
, ∀x ∈ L, ∀T ⊆ N, we obtain the wished result.
Remark 1. Let i ∈ N be a null criterion for v ∈ G(L). We have,
Proposition 2. Under axioms (L) and (N), for every T ⊆ N \ {∅}, there exist real constants b
To prove this result, the following lemmas are useful.
Proof . Let A ⊆ N. We proceed by recurrence on |A|. The relation is obviously true for |A| = 0. Let us suppose that the relation is true for any set of at most |A| − 1 elements, and try to show it is also true for any set of |A| elements. We have , for all x A ∈ L A \{k} A ,
Proof . We shall proceed by induction on n. For simplicity, we denote N \ i by S,
A,C,B , with C ⊆ A. The relation is obviously true for n = 1. Let us suppose that the relation is true for any set of at most n − 1 elements, and try to show it is also true for any set of n elements. We
which is the desired result.
We now prove Proposition 2.
Proof . It is easy to check that the formula satisfies the axioms. Conversely, we consider I v satisfying (L) and (N). Let v ∈ G(L), and T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}. By Proposition 1, there exists a T x ∈ R, for all x ∈ L, such that,
Then,
Assume now that i is null criterion for v. We have v(
By (N), we have, for all i ∈ T null, and for all x −i ∈ L −i ,
Therefore, it suffices to replace the values of a T x in the formula (6), and then the result is established.
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two functions v, w ∈ G(L) such that, for all i ∈ N,
Proof . It is easy to check that the above formula satisfies the axioms. Conversely, we consider I v satisfying (L), (N) and (I). Let v, w ∈ G(L), and T ⊆ N. By Proposition 2 and the axiom (I), we have, for any i ∈ T
and,
. Hence, for any v ∈ G(L), and for any T ⊆ N, we have,
We introduce the Symmetry axiom.
Symmetry axiom (S):
For all v ∈ G(L), for all permutation σ on N,
where b x T ;n 0 ,n 1 ,...,n k ∈ R, and n j = |{ℓ ∈ N \ T, x ℓ = j}| Proof . Let v ∈ G(L) and let σ be a permutation on N. For every x ∈ L, we put
Then, from the symmetry axiom, we have for all y ∈ L such that y T < k T : b
For every y ∈ L such that y T < k, we can write,
Suppose now that σ(T ) = S (with S = T ), and σ(ℓ) = ℓ, ∀ℓ ∈ N \ S ∪ T , then,
we can conclude that the value b T y T ;n(y −T ) does not depend on the exponent T . We denote by b y T ;n(y −T ) this value.
Proposition 5. Under axioms (L), (N), (I) and (S), for any v ∈ G(L), ∀T ⊆ N,
where b n(x −T ) ∈ R, n(x −T ) = (n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k ) and n j = |{ℓ ∈ N \ T, x ℓ = j}|
We introduce now the Recursivity axiom which is the exact counterpart of the one for classical games in (Grabisch and Roubens, 1999) . For this, we introduce the following definitions:
Let v be a multichoice game in G(L) and S ⊆ N. We introduce the restricted multichoice game v −S of v, which is defined on N \ S as follows
The restriction of v to i ∈ N in the presence of i denoted by v
Lemma 3. Under axioms (L), (N), (I) (S) and (R), for any v ∈ G(L), ∀T ⊆ N \ {∅},
is the reduced multichoice game of v to T with respect to A defined on the set {0, . . . , k} (N \T )∪[A] as follows:
Proof . We suppose that the axioms (L), (N), (I), (S) and (R) are satisfied. We proceed by induction on |T |. The formula is true for |T | = 1. Let us assume it is true up to |T | = t − 1, and try to prove it for t elements. By induction assumption we have, for any v ∈ G(L), and i ∈ T ,
Proof . Let v ∈ G(L), and T ∈ N \ {∅}. By axioms (L), (N), (I), (S) and (E), we have
By Lemma (3), we have
Interaction indices for the Choquet integral
We propose in this section an interpretation of the interaction in continuous spaces, that is, after extending v to the continuous domain [0, k] N . The most usual extension of v on [0, k] N is the Choquet integral with respect to k-ary capacities (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2003) . Let z ∈ [0, k] N , and q ∈ L such that q = ⌊z⌋ (the floor integer part of z). The Choquet integral w.r.t. a k-ary capacity v at point z is defined by
where µ q is a capacity given by To prove this result, the following combinatorial result is useful. 
The interaction index on continous domain appears as the mean of relative amplitude of the range of C v w.r.t. T , when the remaining variables take uniformly random values. The partial derivative is the local interaction of C v at point z.
